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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to clarify the kind of capitalist society that is emerging in 
South Korea. To keep the conceptual analysis focused, the paper addresses the 
questions of how and why the structural and institutional socio-economic and political 
arrangements have changed during South Korea’s catch-up process and what others 
could learn from it. Using a historical-comparative approach, the paper shows how 
the economic policy and welfare protection of the developmental welfare capitalism in 
East Asia in general and in South Korea in particular have changed during the differ-
ent stages of the economic catch-up process. In addition, it points out the major chal-
lenges that the model faces in the future. It appears that the socio-economic and po-
litical arrangements of the era reflect the level of economic development and starting 
conditions, on the one hand, and the balance of power between labour, capital and 
the political establishment, on the other hand. The biggest challenge to the democra-
tised and export oriented East Asian developmental welfare capitalism is the urgency 
to find quick but sustainable solutions to the accumulated social problems in the con-
text of worldwide economic recession and intensified globalisation. 
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Karmo Kroos 
 
 
Developmental Welfare Capitalism in East Asia 
with a Special Emphasis on South Korea 
 
[W]hile capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can 
it exist without, the welfare state (Offe 1984, 153, 
italics in original). 
 
 
 
Introduction - Rationale for the Topic and Analytical Framework 
 
This paper investigates the developmental welfare capitalism regimes of Newly In-
dustrialising Countries (NIC) – placing special emphasis on South Korea (henceforth 
Korea). It takes Kosuke and Johnson’s conceptual frame as a basis and structures 
the analysis of the Korean developmental state within four contested themes: indus-
trial policy versus the market, democracy and the developmental state, the time 
frame and government-business relationship. Furthermore, it uses the varieties of 
capitalism (VoC) and welfare state literature to understand the Korean emerging 
market economy. Although these approaches are first used sequentially, an attempt 
is made at the final section of the paper to merge these theoretical frames into a ho-
listic approach – link the production and the welfare regimes to the political system, 
similar to Soskice’s (2007) extended VoC framework, in order to show that the Kore-
an political economy arrangement has not been static but has evolved in stages to 
face the challenges of the era: from the developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s, 
to the modernisation state in the 1980s and finally to the contradictions of the welfare 
state in the 1990s and 2000s. To explain the major building blocks of Korean devel-
opmental welfare capitalism – the developmental state, the welfare regime and the 
political system – the conceptual framework followed in this paper will be introduced 
first.  
 
Although the world is globalising, it is important to recognise that there are still plenty 
of differences within and among capitalist economic models, including the East Asian 
NIC.  Therefore, political economists and economic sociologists argue that in reality 
there is no unified (textbook) model of a market economy that all actually existing 
systems follow. Hence they have proposed the framework of comparative capitalisms 
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instead. This analytical tradition, known as the VoC approach allows one to take into 
account the differences in special institutional arrangements between labour, capital 
and the state. In addition to this, stratification and public policy scholars of welfare 
states and regimes have developed typologies to understand the components of so-
cial policy under different capitalist formations. However, what is largely missing in 
the contemporary literature on VoC and welfare states is an attempt to combine the 
analyses of the economic systems with the social and political arrangements.  
 
The VoC approach to the analysis of national economies dates back at least to the 
1960s when the path-breaking books by Gerschenkron (1962) as well as the re-
search on traditions of diversity of modern capitalism by Shonfield (1965) were pub-
lished.  Indeed, in the 1960sthe triumph of the distinctive national economies of Aus-
tria, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Western Germany, the UK and the 
USA (just to mention the “usual suspects”) triggered a discussion about the diversity 
of capitalist systems. Rather than following one unified free-market model, these na-
tional systems encouraged policy makers and electorates around the world to find 
unique solutions to their national challenges. As Crouch & Streeck (1997, 1) sum up 
the epoch that lasted for two decades before neoliberalism started to spread (symbol-
ised by the triumph of the conservative policies of Reagan and Thatcher on either 
side of the Atlantic): 
Interest in the diversity of modern capitalist economies became widespread as far 
back as the late 1960s, when … technologies and markets were far from fully deter-
minative of social life under capitalism, and … societies had non-trivial alternatives 
with respect to how they wanted to run their respective capitalisms and, by implica-
tion, what kind of society they wanted to be. It was true that sometimes these choices 
had been made long ago and were now deeply entrenched in an established ‘culture’ 
that was, at least in the short term, beyond the reach of contemporary actors. Never-
theless, the very idea of alternatives and choice implied that, to some extent at least, 
purposeful collective action – in one world: politics – could make a difference even 
and precisely for the nature of advanced capitalism. Observed and relentlessly docu-
mented capitalist diversity stood for the promise that, provided one could create the 
‘right’ political conditions, people in twentieth-century societies did have a capacity to 
reorganise their capitalist economic systems in line with collective preferences within 
a broad band of meaningful alternatives. 
 
The success of national economies survived the oil crisis of the 1970s, and the aca-
demic discussion of the national systems based on a unique competitive advantage 
 4 
reached its peak in the 1980s. Indeed, scholars published innumerable studies on 
the models of national political economies, and based on textbooks on comparative 
economic systems, courses and entire programmes were taught at universities 
around the world. To point out just some of the citation classics on East Asian eco-
nomic models, Johnson published the seminal monograph, MITI and Japanese Mira-
cle, in 1982, and the World Bank followed with The East Asian Miracle in 1993.  
 
But the 1990s brought deep recession to Japan and Germany, and the neoclassical 
policy transfer that meant deregulation, privatisation and freedom of trade. Contrary 
to the expectations of eliminating overregulation, improving efficiency, and increasing 
the size of a slice of the enlarged pie for all promised by international trade and divi-
sion of labour based on competitive advantage, Asia instead experienced the finan-
cial crisis of 1997-8.  As policy advice to rescue the countries, reformers in East Asia 
received suggestions along the lines of the Washington Consensus to “get the prices 
right” (also known as the market fundamentalist thesis of getting the state out) during 
the Washington Consensus mark 1, and when this did not work, to “get the institu-
tions right” during the Washington Consensus mark 2. To the great disappointment of 
the developers of the parsimonious development and transition models, the output 
loss in East Asia suggested that the single variable or single set of key determinants 
(such as getting the prices and institutions right) hardly guaranteed a positive turn-
around (W. T. Woo 2004).  
 
Based on this and other recent economic reform experiences in Latin America, East-
ern Europe or Central Asia, it seems reasonable to take Hirschman (1986, Ch. 6) as 
a point of departure and try to complicate the political economy of development. More 
particularly, what is implied in this paper is that the search for a single variable able to 
explain the economic development has led to the false arguments on how my varia-
ble “trumps” everything else or debates as to whether “my variable can swallow your 
variable”.1 Yet, one has to be equally careful to avoid falling into the opposite of the 
single variable approach. That is, one should avoid slipping into another extreme 
where almost anything counts in the attempt to get a holistic picture of development. 
                                                 
1
 The reader may recognise that there is a link to the orthodox training of economists that tends to 
ignore social, historical, political, cultural or geographic phenomena (all of which the institutional 
school and economic geography emphasise) as well as a link to the arguments that there is a need for 
more interdisciplinary training of social scientists (see Kornai 2007, Kroos 2012, Wallerstein 1996, 
2000) to understand the development challenges and figure out the solutions. 
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For instance, one should be careful of the all-inclusive argument, such as the one put 
forward by Roy et al. (2012, 26-27), to explain East Asian economic success. On the 
basis of the success stories of the emerging economies they do not only list different 
institutional factors from the history of religion, the culture, politics as well as corpo-
rate governance, independent technocracy and bureaucracy, but they also add some 
structural factors, such as geography, a sound financial system, human capital and 
land reform to the list as success factors that have played an important role in the 
fast economic growth of East Asian countries. Intuitive as they may sound, there is a 
danger of falling into the opposite extreme of a parsimonious understanding of devel-
opment where almost everything is related to the success of the economic policy.  
As a middle way between the all-inclusive “everything counts” approach of the soci-
ology of development and parsimonious models of one key (set of) variable of neo-
classical economics, this paper follows the attempts to incorporate the economic, 
political and social spheres into the analysis.  While Kang (2006, 6) assesses that the 
VoC approach offers an ambitious “synthesis” of the major sociology of development 
approaches that had been developed over half a century, scholars working within this 
tradition have not stopped there. As shown in Figure 1, Hancké et al. (2007) suggest 
moving beyond VoC and propose an extension of Hall & Soskice’s (2001) original 
two country ideal types – a comparison and contrast of Liberal Market Economies 
and Coordinated Market Economies. Nevertheless, even this can be seen as unsatis-
factory because it is hardly able to incorporate countries such as Korea into the ty-
pology – suggesting that it could be classified together with Italy and Spain under the 
Compensating state type. Since the organised expression of labour interests has not 
always been allowed in Korea, it is difficult to classify it under Étatisme’s type either, 
even though the close relationship between state and economy make it similar to 
France in some respects.  In this context, Kang’s (2006) criticism of the VoC tradition 
that it has been more successful in integrating the state-centred approach (originat-
ing, as mentioned above, from the national economic systems of the 1960s) than it 
has been in incorporating the insights of the society-centred approach (related to the 
welfare regime literature) is a point well taken.  
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Figure 1. State-economy relations, interest organization, and modes of coordination.  
Source: Hancké et al. (2007, 25) 
 
 
To overcome these challenges, alternative VoC approaches have been put forward 
by Amable (2003) with his five types of capitalism and Baumol et al. (2007) with their 
four types of capitalism. Although Amable (2003) embeds a system design into the 
social context and places stronger emphasis on the political dimension (within which 
context the institutions represent the choice of the dominant social coalition), his five 
types of VoC (the Anglo-Saxon’s market based model, Scandinavian welfare state 
model, Continental European Rhinish economy model, Southern European Mediter-
ranean model and Asian Meso-Corporatist model) seem to be locked into the cultural 
background conditions. Although the Baumol et al. (2007, Ch. 4) typology of four 
types of VoC (state-guided capitalism, oligarchic capitalism, big-firm capitalism and 
entrepreneurial capitalism) is said to be more flexible and sensitive to the level of de-
velopment (ibid, 61), it fails to identify any possible role for the political and social di-
mension as drivers or contributors of institutional change over time.  
 
Therefore, to find a balance between a single variable and multidimensional / multi-
disciplinary approaches as well as to avoid the limitations of the above mentioned 
approaches, an attempt is made here to enrich the analytical tradition of VoC by 
complementing the examination of the Korean political economy to welfare and politi-
cal regimes. To that end, Soskice’s (2007) analytical approach, which incorporates 
the production regime, the welfare state and political system into the analysis of VoC, 
is used in this paper for clarifying the Korean developmental welfare capitalism. 
Hence, the paper is organised into three parts in order to interpret the Korean devel-
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opmental welfare capitalism holistically. Starting with an analysis of the Korean politi-
cal economy we shall first analyse its developmental state. To complement this with 
the developments in the social and political spheres, we shall then discuss changes 
in the Korean welfare regime over decades and finally, before drawing conclusions, 
briefly touch on the changes that have occurred in the political system.   
 
 
1. South Korean Political Economy 
 
While the tremendous success of East Asian countries’ post Second World War de-
velopment has not gone unnoticed among scholars, policy advisors and makers, the 
region is often treated as unified and its development model, as homogeneous. The 
prime example of the latter is the World Bank’s miracle report titled The East Asian 
Miracle from 1993 (for concise overviews see also World Bank 1993b and Page 
1994a). As a critique of overgeneralization and lack of sensitivity towards country 
specific nuances of the report, Perkins (1994) argues that There are at Least Three 
Models of East Asian Development. According to him, these three are: “the manufac-
tured export-led state interventionist models of Japan, Korea and Taiwan; the free 
port service, commerce-dominated model of Singapore and Hong-Kong; and models 
of those economies rich in natural resources (at least in the beginning) but not in hu-
man resources (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand)”. In order to understand better 
the historical background of the sub-type to which Korea belongs, the colonial herit-
age of the “the manufactured export-led state interventionist model” (also known as 
the developmental state) will be discussed briefly prior to a more detailed analysis of 
it central issues.  
 
Unlike many less developed countries that followed Nehru’s Indian Consensus model 
for post-colonial development, Waelbroeck (1998b, 325) argues that the Four Drag-
ons (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan [China]) followed the 
Japanese example. This proved to be a good choice and should not be too surprising 
given the fact that there are three countries in Northeast Asia that formed the core of 
the Japanese empire in the pre-war period: Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Indeed, as 
Woo-Cumings (1999a, xi-xii) assesses, “[n]othing succeeds like success, and thus 
Korea and Taiwan learned lessons and absorbed advanced technologies and capital 
from Japan, and then embarked on a similar trajectory of light-industrial exporting 
under multi-year plans, guided by strong state ministries (if less so in Taiwan than 
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Korea). This gave all three economies a highly neomercantilist, nationalist tendency; 
in Japan and Korea especially, it meant strong state involvement with and promotion 
of big economic conglomerates.”  
 
Nevertheless, the Japanese colonial past of the success stories of the NIC tends to 
be forgotten in the mountains of academic publications published about the East 
Asian miracle in general and about Korea in particular. More precisely, one of the first 
analyses of Korean economic success by Frank et al. (1975) actually devotes a sep-
arate chapter to the economic history of the country since the Second World War but 
fails to make the connection to its colonial past as anything positive.  As with many 
other scholars discussing Korean development, Frank et al. (ibid, 226-7) note the 
possible impact of Japanese colonialism only in passing – in the form of the type of 
industrial relations between paternalistic employers and loyal employees, the indus-
trial structure and development model to be followed and imitated (despite the ex-
tremely unpopular colonisation). Instead, the Japanese colonial past is presented as 
economic dependency and domination – a development trap to be overcome rather 
than something to be benefited from. It is also understandable, as the aim of Frank et 
al. is to analyse the influence of the Korean foreign trade regime and therefore the 
emphasis on the role of export that has dominated the study of Korean economic 
success since then.  
 
Also, in other publications, the Korean colonial past has been mentioned in passing 
(see e.g. Cumings 1984; Goodman & Peng 1996, 195-200; Johnson 1987; J. Woo 
1991, 66; Holliday 2005; Pirie 2008, 64; and Ramesh 2004, 3) and its impact on the 
Korean growth model is systematically analysed in very few cases. And in the few 
cases in which the challenge is accepted a diametrically opposite position is reached. 
In other words, there is “disagreement … as to whether Japanese colonisation basi-
cally distorted or laid down groundwork for development” (Cheng 1990, 140). On the 
one hand, Eckert (1992) and Kohli (1994, 1997, 1999) argue that despite the brutality 
of the Japanese colonialism, it was namely this past dependent historical experience 
that left the imprint of the political economy and allowed Korea to catch up with the 
developed world in such a short period of time after the Second World War.  On the 
other hand, Chang shows that the colonial past (2006, Ch. 4), or more broadly, the 
culture (2007, Ch. 9) cannot explain the success of NIC. Given the impossibility of 
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collecting contrafactual evidence to learn what would have happened if the countries 
had not had a Japanese colonial past, the controversy is difficult to settle. Neverthe-
less, what can be studied more closely is the political economy arrangement known 
as the “developmental state”, which a subgroup of NIC, such as Korea, adopted from 
Japan and has been implementing quite successfully since the 1960s. 
 
Korea borrowed the developmental state approach to economic development from 
Japan and implemented it relatively successfully until it was hit by the Asian Financial 
crisis and serious doubts were raised about her political economy arrangement 
(sometimes described as “crony capitalism”). Although the authors of the World Bank 
(1993a) miracle report (see also Page 1994a & 1994b) have attempted to downplay 
the role of the state in the extraordinary economic progress of East Asia and have 
tried to emphasise as well as interpret the success story of the East Asian NIC as a 
confirmation of its neoliberal policy (labelling the actual practices of the region as 
“market friendly”), the so called “revisionist school” has vehemently criticised the re-
port (see Amsden 1994, Lall 1994, Perkins 1994, Rodrik 1994 and Yanagihara 
1994). More specifically, the critics of the miracle report have seriously questioned 
the selective use and interpretation of data, the lack of attention to initial conditions 
(education and equality) as well as the total ignorance of any of the countervailing 
arguments that the area specialists have produced during the decades of research – 
a practice whose aim seems to be an attempt to downplay the active role of the state 
in the East Asian (including Korean) political economy of development.  While there 
have been many rounds of debate over the role of the state in the miracle on which 
literature overviews can be found elsewhere (e.g. Chu 1997), it is clear that the East 
Asian financial crisis called for the need to rethink the underlying assumptions of the 
miracle and to formulate a new development paradigm (including the state and the 
market relationship) for the region (see e.g. Park et al. 2004, W. T. Woo 2004, and 
Stiglitz & Yusuf 2001).  
 
Irrespective of these academic quarrels over the role of the state in East Asian de-
velopment (which at times tends to become rather ideological), the theoretical dispute 
over the applicability of the market and state failures as arguments for and against 
interventionism in the economy and its development continue (see e.g. Amsden 
1992, Wade 1988, Kruger 1974 & 1990, Lall 1994, Rodrik 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 
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1996b and Stiglitz 1988, 153-156 & 1989). The strongest argument of the revisionist 
school in this context seems to be the empirical evidence from (not so) distant eco-
nomic history. According to Chu (1997, 19) and Chang (2002b, 2003 & 2009, 8), 
there is hardly a successful case of economic development where state intervention 
did not have the upper hand. Starting from the industrialisation of England – a crucial 
case in this respect that was raised by Polanyi (1944 [1957], Ch. 6) – and ending with 
the NICs’ (including Hong Kong and Singapore as the textbook cases of laissez-faire, 
which have been studied closely by Lam 2000) successful catch-up with industrial-
ised countries, the state actually has played an important role in industrial develop-
ment. In other words, even in the cases that are widely believed to be examples of 
laissez-faire economic policy, the visible hand has been complemented by the invisi-
ble one. The paradoxical lesson (even if not yet the widespread consensus) from this 
is that the market needs a strong government (see e.g. Evans et al. 1985, Deyo 
1987, Bardhan 1990 and Stiglitz 2001) and an open economy demands a bigger 
state than a closed one (Rodrik 1998). Pempel (1999, 139) sums up much of the 
scholarship as well as popular understanding on the role of state in East Asian eco-
nomic success stories:  
The East Asian states, it is argued, have been successful because governments there 
have acquired control over a variety of things presumed critical to economic success: 
they can extract capital; generate and implement national economic plans; manipulate 
private access to scarce resources; coordinate the efforts of individual businesses; 
target specific industrial projects; resist political pressures from popular forces, such 
as consumers and organised labour; insulate their domestic economies from exten-
sive foreign capital penetration; and, most especially, carry through a sustained pro-
ject of ever-improving productivity, technological sophistication, and increased world 
market shares.  
 
In this context, it is now hardly questioned that the government strongly intervened in 
the East Asian post-Second World War development. The close relationship between 
the government and the market that has been developed in the state interventionist 
models of Japan, Korea and Taiwan is known as “developmental state”. It is a con-
cept that originates from Chalmers Johnson’s book MITI and the Japanese Miracle: 
The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-19752 and can be seen as a label that attempts 
                                                 
2
 For the “odyssey of a concept” see also Johnson (1999) and for the genealogy of the term see Cum-
ings (1999) and of the idea see Leftwich (1995). 
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to capture the essence of one of the three ideal types of states3.  Unlike the “plan 
ideological” sub-type of the Soviet developmental state (see White 1984), the East 
Asian is “plan rational”. That is, East Asian NIC, which follow this development strat-
egy, believe that their destinies can be changed – miracles can be created or the ini-
tial conditions can at least be combined so innovatively that they allow for the design 
of a tailor-made solution for the situation that is most suitable for the national devel-
opment needs. This stands in contrast to accepting the destiny and trying to build on 
the competitive advantage as suggested by Ricardian inspired neoclassical political 
economy of development (see Srinivasan 1985). But that is not all; it also presuppos-
es a capable government which is why Leftwich (1995, 401) defines developmental 
states as “states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy and 
capacity at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit 
developmental objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions and 
direction of economic growth, or by organising it directly, or a varying combination of 
both.”  
 
Speaking of the origin of the developmental state within the history of economic ide-
as, Fallows (1994, 179) and Leftwich (1995, 401-402) trace the idea back to List 
(1885 [1996], 175-178) who put forward the idea that to catch-up with advanced na-
tions state intervention in less developed countries is necessary – a very similar idea 
to what Gerschenkron (1962, Ch. 1) later made famous. However, contrary to the 
Russian state intervention for military aims, List makes a futuristic argument if one 
observes the success story of the export oriented countries of mass production in 
East Asia that materialised approximately a century later. He (1885 [1996], 178) 
states: “… a perfectly developed manufacturing industry, an important mercantile ma-
rine, and foreign trade on a really large scale can only be attained by means of the 
interposition of the power of the State.”     
 
Leftwich (1995, see also 1996) identifies six major components that define the (the 
model of) developmental state: (i) a determined developmental elite – leadership by 
determined and relatively incorrupt developmental elites; (ii) the relative autonomy of 
the state from domestic special interests; (iii) a powerful, competent and insulated 
                                                 
3
 For alternative typologies see White (1984) who identifies state capitalist, intermediate and state 
socialist; and Evans (1989) who distinguishes between predatory, developmental and other apparat-
uses of third world states.  
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economic bureaucracy; (iv) the weak and subordinated civil society; (v) the effective 
management of non-state economic interest; and (vi) repression, legitimacy and per-
formance. In short, he puts emphasis on politics and state capacity and perhaps not 
enough on the complicated relationship with big business – a criticism that Leftwich 
(2001, 152) accepts. Furthermore, as the analysis of the developmental state around 
these defining features can be found elsewhere (see Clapham 1996) and the differ-
ent theoretical perspectives on the politics of East Asian development (liberal institu-
tionalism with universalistic policy suggestions; culturalism with emphasis on contin-
gent issues such as culture; and globalism with a focus on geographical and timing 
factors) are analysed by Zhang (2003), the discussion to follow will take Johnson’s 
understanding of the defining features of the developmental state as the basis. Actu-
ally, he has put forward at least two conceptualisations of the developmental state. In 
the 1987 paper entitled Political institutions and economic performance he lists and 
discusses seven key issues of the capitalist developmental state: financial control; 
labour relations; autonomy of the economic bureaucracy; autonomy of the state from 
business interests; balancing incentives with commands in administrative guidance; 
large business conglomerates; and foreign capital.  More than a decade later, how-
ever, he (1999, 46-60) narrows them down to four in the reflections on the basis of 
Oyama Kosuke’s review of his seminal book on MITI and Japanese political econo-
my. Since he regards the latter as the best conceptualisation of the defining issues of 
the developmental state, it is also taken as the starting point of the analysis of the 
Korean case in the sections to follow. These four fundamental issues related to the 
developmental state are: (i) industrial policy versus the market, (ii) democracy and 
the developmental state, (iii) the time frame, and (iv) the government-business rela-
tionship. All together these themes characterise the Korean developmental state and 
economy. Therefore, we shall discuss them one by one.  
 
 
1.1. Industrial Policy versus the Market 
 
Existing literature reviews on state intervention (Block 1994, Chang 2002a), regula-
tion (Chang 1997) and industrial policy (Chang 1994 & 2009, Kosacoff & Ramos 
1999, Pack & Saggi 2006, Rodrik 1995b, Shapiro & Taylor 1990, and Shapiro 2007) 
as well as the seminal original contributions that have been made about these issues 
within the East Asian development controversy (see e.g. Amsden 1989 & 1992, 
Amsden & Chu 2003, Barrett & Chin 1987, Campos & Root 1996, Chang 1993 & 
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2006, Chu 1997, Fishlow et al. 1994, Johnson 1982, 1984, 1987 & 1999, E. M. Kim 
1997, Krugman 1994a, Lall 1994, Nolan & Pack 2003, Park et al. 2004, Page 1994a 
& 1994b, Shapiro 2007, Wade 1990, and World Bank 1993a, esp. Ch. 6) indicate that 
the heated debate about the role of the state and the market in the East Asian eco-
nomic success story in general and the industrial policy in the Korean one in particu-
lar has been active for a while. Despite the length and many rounds of debate (with 
their reflections on the changes in the international economic environment), the com-
plicated relationship between government and businesses within the East Asian eco-
nomic development in general and the Korean developmental state approach to 
catching up in particular continues to be a source of conflicting conclusions. For in-
stance, the issues related to the possibility of moral hazard, the economic impact of 
state interventions in picking winners instead of protecting losers; getting interven-
tions, structure and prices right (or wrong); engaging in import substitution and/or ex-
port promotion are hardly less controversial after all these years of debate.4  
 
To start with, it has to be made clear what is meant by “industrial policy” in this con-
text. In the above mentioned literature on the NIC development experience, it does 
“not mean any policy that affects industry but a very particular type of policy that af-
fects industries. It is what is commonly known as “selective industrial policy” or “tar-
geting” – namely, a policy that deliberately favours particular industries over others, 
against market signals, usually (but not necessarily) to enhance efficiency and pro-
mote productivity growth” (Chang 2009, 2). As for the “market”, it is understood in this 
                                                 
4
 This is clearly an arbitrary selection of a much larger number of issues that have been debated on 
within the East Asian industrial policy debate. For instance, Chang (2009, 3-4) lists the following top-
ics:  
(i) coordination of complementary investments (the so-called Big Push); (ii) coordina-
tion of competing investments through entry regulation, “investment cartels”, and (in 
declining industries) negotiated capacity cuts; (iii) policies to ensure scale economies 
(e.g., licensing conditional upon production scale, emphasis on the infant industries 
starting to export from early on, state-mediated mergers and acquisitions); (iv) regula-
tion of technology imports (e.g., screening for overly obsolete technologies, cap on 
technology licensing royalties); (v) regulation of foreign direct investment (e.g., entry 
and ownership restrictions, local contents requirement, technology transfer require-
ments, export requirements); (vi) mandatory worker training for firms above a certain 
size, in order to resolve the collective action problem in the supply of skilled workers 
due to the possibility of “poaching”; (vii) the state acting as a venture capitalist and in-
cubating high-tech firms; (viii) export promotion (e.g., export subsidies, export loan 
guarantees, marketing help from the state trading agency); (ix) government allocation 
of foreign exchanges, with top priority going to capital goods imports (especially for 
export industries) and bottom priority, to luxury consumption good imports. 
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context in an oversimplified way5 as the opposite to state intervention or bureaucratic 
coordination (for details see Kornai 1984). 
 
On the one hand, the supporters of state intervention and believers of the positive 
impact of the industrial policy in East Asian NIC, such as Korea, argue that the active 
role played by the state in the late industrialisation is central to their economic suc-
cess stories. Among these are two slightly different schools of thought that have been 
advancing this argument: the Weberian (institutionalist) and the neo-Marxist (struc-
turalist / dependent development) perspective. Without going into details here, the 
Weberian school basically follows Johnson’s lead (see e.g. Johnson 1982 and 1987 
as well as Page 1994a, 620) and emphasises the role of efficient bureaucracy (such 
as MITI in the Japanese case). However, the world system theorists of dependent 
development hold that the “artificial” development of the semi-periphery locks these 
countries into a dependent position and makes them vulnerable in the world econo-
my, which is controlled by core countries’ capital, technology, markets and transna-
tional companies (see e.g. Arrighi et al. 2003).  
 
There are problems with both perspectives. On the one hand, the problem with the 
good governance argument is that it depicts the state as a homogeneous body of 
policymaking and implementation which lacks any internal conflict and assumes that 
the developmental state polices lead to economic growth without actually showing 
the causality, according to Lie (1990).6 On the other hand, the problem with the world 
system theorists is that they fail to see that some developing countries “have been 
able to beat the system” and have climbed the ladder because they have been able 
to take advantage of their structural factors, such as size, or institutional advantages, 
such as human capital, according to Amsden (2003, 37). Furthermore, Deyo (1987, 
17-18) summarises the contrafactual evidence from East Asian NIC in the following: 
East Asian industrialisation departs from the expectations of those writers in the de-
pendency tradition who argue that external economic dependency is associated with 
long-run economic stagnation and economic inequality, loss of economic autonomy in 
economic restructuring and the formation of development strategy, and a weakness of 
                                                 
5
 Chang (2002a, 544), for instance, states that “defining a free market is at the deepest level a point-
less exercise because no market is in the end ‘free’ as all markets have some state regulations on 
who can participate in which markets and on what terms.”  
6
 The (lack of evidence for) causality between industrial policy and economic development has given 
birth to a heated debate – see World Bank (1993 Ch. 6) and Lall (1994, 650-652) as well as Chang 
(2009) and Pack & Saggi (2006). 
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domestic states. Rather, the East Asian NICs present a pattern not only of continued 
high growth rates but also of relatively equitable development, a continuing ability to 
alter domestic economic structures and world market position to adjust to changing 
economic circumstances and an enhanced rather than a diminished state power to 
mobilise and deploy domestic economic resources.  
 
Nevertheless, the supporters of the idea that industrial policy has hardly made any 
positive impact on East Asian development argue that its success stories should be 
associated with market friendly policies instead. This has also been the official line of 
the World Bank (see World Bank 1993a; and Page 1994a & 1994b), and it relates to 
the neoclassical school’s traditional interpretation of industrial policy as a source of 
market distortion (see Bhagwati 1982, Kruger 1974 & 1990, Nolan & Pack 2003 and 
Pack & Saggi 2006).  Again, drawing on the East Asian economic success story in 
general and the Korean one in particular, E. M. Kim (1997, 11) problematises the po-
sition of the neoclassical school by pointing out that 
(1) it neglected the role of the state as having an independent and leading role in the 
economy; (2) it assumed the private sector in Korea to be not very different from the 
“rational,” “free” enterprises found in the West, which tend to work in relatively free 
markets; and (3) it ignored structural obstacles that may hinder economic develop-
ment, such as [an] unreceptive international market and MNCs, and [the] destruction 
of [the] economy caused by war, and so on. 
 
There is also a milder version of the market-cantered school that would accept state 
intervention if there were negative externalities (Stiglitz 1988, 153-156 & 1989), if the 
harm arising from government failures were smaller than from market failures (Fish-
low 1990) or if it were needed for the promotion of market institutions (Datta-
Chaudhuri 1990 & Stiglitz 2001). This middle-ground position does not question the 
idea of state intervention on technical grounds (as the proper neoclassical school 
does) or dispute it on ideological positions (as some representatives of the Austrian 
School of Economics do). Instead, it takes issue with the quality of state intervention. 
Indeed, Bardhan (1990, 4-5) assesses in the editorial of the Symposium on the State 
and Economic Development:   
In much of the neoclassical literature the emphasis is on the extent of state interven-
tion; mostly, of course, on the harmful effects of that intervention. As a matter of fact, 
almost all states in developing countries, successful or otherwise, are interventionist, 
and the important question is not really about the extent but the quality of that inter-
vention. We need to understand why the quality of intervention is so different in the 
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different states, even when those states command similar instruments of intervention 
and sometimes display similar extents of intervention… 
 
Within this context it has been puzzling for the development scholars such as Rodrik 
(1996a, 19-21) to understand “How Did East Asian Countries Manage to Intervene 
without Inviting Rent Seeking?” in general and “Why did trade protection, industrial 
policy, and subsidised credit work in these countries [Korea and Taiwan] when it 
failed most everywhere else?” in particular. His honest answer to these questions in 
the review article of the Journal of Economic Literature is that “we do not really know” 
(ibid, 19). His best guess is that there must have been something special about these 
countries policy makers’ ability to discipline their private and public actors – an 
acknowledgement that begs rather than answers the questions. That means Rodrik is 
forced to admit as an answer to his own follow-up question “where this ability came 
from and whether it can be replicated in other settings remain a mystery” (ibid).  
Nonetheless, this does not prevent him from suggesting that development states 
such as Korea were special in their ability to identify and solve successfully the “co-
ordination failures”. According to Rodrik (1996b), these include a form of market fail-
ures that middle-income countries, which are locked into low-wage and/or low-tech 
equilibrium, typically face. More specifically, without government subsidy to solve the 
private sector’s lack of interest in undertaking activities that need specialised inputs, 
the NIC would not have produced miracles. Rather than getting the prices or institu-
tions right or wrong, they got the “interventions right” by “coordinating and encourag-
ing private (and public) investments with a high degree of linkages within the modern 
sector” (1995, 97). In other words, what we have here is a kind of merging of the 
Krugmanian “extraordinary mobilisation of resources” (see Krugman 1994a, 78) and 
Hirschmanian ideas of forward and backward linkages (see Hirschman 1986, Ch. 3) 
with a growing understanding of the critical role of technology in economic develop-
ment (see Freeman 1994 for the literature overview). 
 
Nonetheless, this does not explain how developmental states like Korea managed to 
intervene successfully when others failed – a puzzle that Rodrik himself highlights.7 
                                                 
7
 Actually Rodrik (1996a, 20) also adds to the above mentioned possible reasons “the special initial 
conditions”. What he  means by this is not the colonial past that enabled Korean leaders to intervene 
successfully, rather the much better educated labour force (given its income level) as well as the equal 
distribution of wealth and income (around 1960) which may explain the overall economic success story 
but not the successful state intervention. For more details about his position on the role of Korean 
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Probably, the most compelling argument offered (at least before the East Asian fi-
nancial crisis) originates from Westphal (1990, 44), who explains that Korean indus-
trial policy consists of two interrelated parts that relate to the two objectives that Ko-
rean economic policy has set for itself since the 1960s: encourage exports and pro-
mote infant industries. These components should be acknowledged but not confused 
with one-another. As described in detail by Westphal, the export promotion, which 
has used free trade as its primary “incentive scheme”, is essentially a policy neutral 
tool because all it did was to abandon the idea of imposing tariffs and import quotas 
on the importation of capital and intermediate inputs for sectors and goods where a 
competitive advantage was detected. However, the infant industry promotion, with 
the aim of (re)creating comparative advantages, has used protection as its dominant 
incentive and logically has not been policy neutral. Furthermore, according to West-
phal (ibid, 47) it is also important to add that the protection of infant industries in Ko-
rea has almost always applied only to non-export sales.  
 
Based on all this, he (ibid, 56-57) offers five lessons from Korean industrial policy: (i) 
the aim of state intervention has to be the attainment of international competitiveness 
or self-sufficiency (in the given geo-political context); (ii) policy makers should seek 
advice and collect relevant information to judge the potential for exploiting or devel-
oping the competitive advantage; (iii) the industry specific strategies should not be 
firmly fixed and followed regardless of the experience and knowledge acquired during 
the implementation; (iv) the number of industries targeted at any one time should be 
greatly limited in order not to spread technical and entrepreneurial talent; and (v) the 
state should not concentrate its intervention efforts on the areas where the country 
has a competitive advantage because of the possibility of being excessively crowded 
out in international competition. 
 
In short, Korean industrial policy found a way to enable the visible and invisible hand 
to cooperate closely, making it incorrect to emphasise one over the other. Rather one 
should try to understand the way it produced economic progress to catch up. As 
many nuances in the industrial policy implementation overlap with the relations with 
big business, we shall suspend the discussion here and postpone it for the upcoming 
sections. Hopefully, together with this analysis, one gets a better idea of how exactly 
                                                                                                                                                        
education and equality in economic development see Rodrik (1994 & 1996a, 20-21) as well as Alesina 
& Rodrik (1994), 
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Korea managed to implement the industrial policy and the extent to which its effect(s) 
have been positive or distortionary – issues that remain most contested. 
 
 
1.2. Democracy and the Developmental State 
 
A further characteristic of the developmental state relates to politics and the relation-
ship of the political regime to democracy. While some commentators have associated 
Johnson’s ideas of the developmental state with (soft) authoritarianism (see Benczes 
2000 and Gills 1996, 667 respectively) and some others like Rodrik (1996a, 23) have 
expressed uneasy feelings about speculating that authoritarianism may have been 
involved in the East Asian ability to intervene successfully (noting that “there are too 
many mismanaged dictatorships around the world to take the hypothesis seriously”), 
the complicated relationship between the developmental state and democracy cannot 
be denied. Although Johnson warns against the dangers of a non-democratic gov-
ernment (1987, 143) and refuses to accept that there is “any necessary connection 
between authoritarianism and the developmental state,” he also acknowledges “that 
authoritarianism can sometimes inadvertently solve the main political problem of 
economic development using market forces – namely how to mobilise the over-
whelming majority of the population to work and sacrifice for developmental projects” 
(1999, 52). His Weberian argument is that in a truly developmental state power is 
held not through cohesive means but by legitimation, typically enjoyed by revolution-
aries.8 
 
On the one hand, it is true that the East Asian fast growing NIC were not democratic 
when they concentrated on economic catch-up. On the other hand, it is also correct 
to say that some of them have become democratic during the process. Indeed, the 
Korean economy was set on the trajectory of recovery, development and success by 
the military coup led by General Park Chung Hee on May 16, 1961. It was this au-
thoritarian military regime that directed the nation to “The Road toward Economic 
Self-Sufficiency and Prosperity” and produced the fastest growing economy (with an 
average of 8.7% present annual growth) in the world between 1980 and 1991 (E. M. 
Kim 1997, 2).  However, the paradox here is that the very economic success of the 
                                                 
8
 Reflecting on the Japanese case, it would probably be more appropriate to speak of legitimisation by 
charismatic leadership – as enjoyed, for instance, by Lenin or Castro. Speaking of the bureaucrats it 
would be more appropriate to speak of goal-rational legitimisation, which is also known as teleological 
rule (see Konrad and Szelenyi 1979). 
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Korean developmental state also gave birth to democratisation. Indeed, since the 
mid-1980s Korea has seriously been on the road to democratisation, ending the au-
thoritarian regime and bringing a democratic transition to the country in 1987. E. M. 
Kim’s analysis of the relationship between big business and the state between 1960 
and 1990 demonstrates in detail how the labour movement (both legal and under-
ground) grew and “became a formidable voice for democratisation” (ibid, 4) in the 
Korean public-private-partnership where big business conglomerates and govern-
ment repressed labour and excluded them from enjoying the fruits of economic 
growth for decades. It shows that despite the success of big business in delaying the 
development of political freedoms in Korea and Taiwan, eventually it happened. In 
short, “late democratisation followed late industrialisation” (Thompson 1996, 643).  
 
This description matches the expectations of the modernisation theory advanced 
most prominently by Lipset (1959). To put it simply, the theory argues that countries’ 
political and economic systems go hand in hand – for instance, a liberal democracy 
needs free markets. Once a country’s socio-economic development reaches a certain 
level, it requires more skilled labour, which leads to expansion of education and de-
velopment of critical thinking. Before long, demands for political liberalisation and 
democratisation are voiced. While many had written the modernisation theory off due 
to a lack of any serious empirical validity, the events in Eastern Europe, Former So-
viet Union as well as in some NIC caused it to resurface. Indeed, Korean socio-
economic development since the 1960s and consequent democratic changes in the 
political sphere since the 1980s match the theory: economic growth has led to social 
mobilisation associated with modernisation – growth of urbanisation, mass communi-
cation, expansion of education and the creation of new social classes demanding 
political participation. But what has been missing in the classical modernisation theo-
ry according to Thompson (1996, 627) is precisely the role played by the develop-
mental state in the less developed countries that start industrialisation under non-
democratic political leadership. Therefore, it makes sense to add this component to 
the modernisation theory, while at the same time realising that the developmental 
state’s relationship to democracy is not static but dynamic. As E. M. Kim (1997) 
stresses – there is a need to understand the dynamic and changing nature of the 
state, business, and one may add, labour relations of the Korean political economy 
as a source of democratisation. That is, one needs to recognise that there has been 
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the evolution from the comprehensive to the limited developmental state in Korea. It 
may be politically difficult to accept, and it can be easily misinterpreted, but the non-
democratic developmental state may be necessary to serve as a catalyst for modern-
isation and democratisation.9 
 
 
1.3. The Time Frame 
 
Oyama takes issue with Johnson that the description and analysis of Japan as a de-
velopmental state in the chosen time frame between 1925 and 1975 is arbitrary – 
suggesting that if another period were used, a different conclusion could be reached. 
Indeed, Johnson (1999, 54) accepts that the chosen time frame is somewhat arbi-
trary, but also defends himself on the grounds that “[t]he mid-1970s saw the end of 
the era of Japan’s catching up and the beginning of its uneasy tenure as an econom-
ic superpower, which is why my book ends there.”  There are two important issues 
that emerge from this exchange of ideas. As mentioned above, the developmental 
state is not a static formation but a dynamic one. It changes or evolves along the 
changing geopolitical circumstances and international economic relations as ex-
plained on the basis of the Korean example by E. M. Kim (1997). In addition to the 
exceptional post-Second World War era that brought more state intervention to many 
countries, there is the question of transferability of the policy outside East Asia, which 
reflects the controversial role of initial conditions in socio-economic development. 
 
Korean development has been described in sequence by a number of scholars, but 
Gereffi has created a research programme out of it. He (1989 & 1994; see also Ger-
effi & Wyman 1990) has analysed Korea in comparison to Latin American countries 
and diagrammed its developmental path as shown in Figure 2. According to this, the 
era of the Korean colonial past is described as a primary commodity export, and the 
1950’s introduced the era of primary import substitution industrialisation (ISI) for con-
sumer goods and attempts to take advantage of land surplus (in addition to the 
struggle to survive with the help of international aid). The 1960’s initiated the era of 
                                                 
9
 India as a counterfactual to Korea in this respect is quite telling. While some scholars like E. M. Kim 
(1997, 217) argue that “it is not clear whether more political freedom and democracy in the initial pha-
se of economic development would have occurred at a slower pace” in Korea, it can be problematised 
on the basis of India that chose a democratic development political system but has not been develo-
ping anywhere as quickly as the Four Dragons in Northeast Asia (see Herring 1999 and Currie 1996 
for details of the Indian case with respect to developmental state and democracy). 
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primary export orientation industrialisation (EOI) that tried to take advantage of un-
skilled labour surplus was introduced in Korea; the 1970’s era added increased utili-
sation of capital as well as the selective use of (secondary) ISI; and the 1980’s 
brought EOI diversification and emphasis on technology-based production as well as 
liberalisation and democratisation. The 1990’s brought the East Asian financial crisis 
and IMF intervention together with the structural adjustment programme to liberalise 
further (see Gills 1996).  Last but not least, the on-going 2000s have brought globali-
sation as well as the global financial and economic crises which have hit the export 
sectors badly and wiped out1.63 million jobs (Son & San 2009, 23). According to E. 
M. Kim (1997), all these policy amendments resulted in a fundamental change from a 
“comprehensive developmental state” to a “limited developmental state” by the end of 
1980 when democratisation brought an end to an authoritarian government. Although 
there are some who have declared the developmental state dead (Fine 1999, Deen 
2011), the majority of the scholars who have contemplated  its future in the wake of 
the financial crisis (e.g. Holliday 2005) or in the context of globalisation (e.g. Shin 
2005) have found for different reasons that the spread of capitalism demands even 
stronger government involvement.  
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Figure 2. Paths of Industrialisation in Latin America and East Asia: Commonalities, Diver-
gence, and Convergence. 
Source: Gereffi (1989, 517)  
 
 
Instead of making an argument for getting the prices, institutions or interventions 
right, Gereffi as well as Amsden and Chu make the argument for “getting the struc-
ture ‘right’”. In other words, they explain how latecomers in modernisation and eco-
nomic development upscale into more technologically complex industries and com-
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mercially demanding services. While Gereffi (1994, 222-224) explains on the basis of 
historical evidence that export oriented countries in East Asia have gone through 
progressive sophistication of their economies – a process that resembles climbing 
the ladder starting from primary commodity export, export-processing zones, compe-
tent supply subcontracting, original equipment manufacturing, and as the final stage, 
original brand-name manufacturing; Amsden and Chu (2003) make a late structuralist 
argument. Contrary to neoclassical economics’ understanding of the structural 
change in developing countries (see Syrquin 1988), the late structuralist argument 
emphasises the change in the economy as a whole during the country’s journey dif-
ferent stages of development (see Dutt & Ros 2003 and Gibson 2003), which pro-
vides an explanation for the developmental states’ conscious wish, and in some cas-
es such as Korea, the ability to alter the structure of the economy.  
 
The above mentioned structuralist argument resembles in spirit Rostow’s (1960) The 
Stages of Economic Growth. Although Rostow’s contribution to the economics of de-
velopment is not perhaps taken as seriously now as it was prior to the triumph of ne-
oclassical economics, one has to admit that retrospectively the post-Second World 
War developments in NIC are not too far from the sequence laid down in his theory 
along the following milestones: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, 
the take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass-consumption. And despite 
the infrequent mention of his name in the contemporary literature on NIC catch-up 
process, the logical description of Korean development in stages, presidential re-
gimes or decades is still rather common. This is not a coincidence as Rostow actually 
appears to be behind the Korean development model. More precisely, Natsios (2012) 
refers to an important upcoming book under the title “The Secret Successes of 
USAID” by Michael Pillsbury on the basis of recently declassified CIA cables. Accord-
ing to these sources, Rostow, as a senior Advisor to Kennedy and later to Johnson, 
had just finished the above mentioned book, and his ideas formed the theoretical 
foundation for the tied aid for General Park Chung-hee who had assumed the presi-
dency in 1961 and who, according to Natsios, is said to have complained shortly af-
terwards to the CIA that USAID economists had taken over the running of the coun-
try.  
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The politics of tied aid relates to the geo-political environment of Korea at the time of 
the economic catch-up process. In addition to the realisation that the relationship be-
tween state, business and society is not constant or static but in a permanent state of 
change and that there may be lack or scarcity of political commitment, one needs to 
understand that the circumstances within which the East Asian developmental states 
managed to catch up with the developed economies were exceptional and may not 
be replicable elsewhere. Indeed, one has to take into account the outcomes of the 
Korean War and the Cold War more generally – the military threat from North Korea 
and possible Soviet expansion as well as the US military presence, political support, 
economic assistance and access to its markets – to understand the conditions under 
which the Korean developmental state managed to catch up with developed coun-
tries economically. Furthermore, the unique historical conditions in the international 
political economy during Korea’s catch-up stage allow one to cast doubt on the trans-
ferability of its developmental state policy elsewhere. As Pirie (2008, 75) argues in his 
monograph on the Korean developmental state:  
If there is a central theme to the analysis of the Korean developmental state offered 
within this thesis[,] it is that the project of state-led industrialisation was a product of, 
and its success was dependent on the existence of, a complex confluence of circum-
stances. It is impossible to understand why Korea exhibited such economic dynamism 
without understanding Korean history, the nature of post-war global political/economic 
structures, and the particular position Korea occupied within these structures. Such an 
understanding highlights two things. First, it exposes the shortcomings of those theo-
rists who argue that it is possible for other states to replicate the Korean experience 
by simply pursuing the ‘correct’ policies. Second, and more importantly … it serves to 
highlight the essentially time-bound nature of the Korean state-led development pro-
ject. Global industrial/economic and political structures are by their very nature dy-
namic, not ossified and static. 
 
 
1.4. Government-Business Relationship 
 
There is hardly a component in the developmental state structure that is more con-
troversial than the relationship between government and big business. Although 
Johnson (1999, 56) regards government-business relationships the most important 
aspect of the developmental state, he adds that “[t]he exact nature and terms of the 
internal organisation of “Japan, Inc.” remain obscure” (ibid, 59). This observation can 
easily be extended to Korea as her development strategies were largely patterned if 
not copied from Japan, which functioned as an exemplar for economic progress and 
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catch-up with the West, as mentioned above. Although the corporatist political-
economy arrangements can be found also in Western market economies (see e.g. 
Katzenstein 1984 & 1985), it seems that what Korea has copied from Japan with re-
spect to the business relations is difficult for Westerners to comprehend within the 
dichotomous conceptual models of public-private, state-civilian, partisan-nonpartisan, 
formal-informal, official-nonofficial, governmental-market, legal-illegal, regulated-
customary and/or procedural-substantial that we have been socialised to view appro-
priate government-business relationships without the risk of corruption or rent-
seeking and hence, welfare loss.  
 
This contrast between Western and East Asian government-business relationships’ 
traditions is crucial. E. M. Kim (1997, Ch. 8) and Ahn (2001, 425-428) describe the 
Chaebols10  as the central success factor in Korea’s EOI. The government used the-
se big business conglomerates for state-led industrialisation in an increasing manner 
until the boundaries of the two became rather blurred. First, in the 1960’s government 
intervention was automatic and sector neutral as long as they engaged in export ac-
tivities (see also the discussion on industrial policy above). In the 1970’s, the gov-
ernment introduced and implemented seven specific industry promotion acts which 
led to the development of the heavy and chemical industries in order to upgrade the 
economic structure, prepare for the exploitation of economies of scale, take ad-
vantage of private R&D capacities and build up national security. To achieve these 
goals, Korean policy makers seem to have used primarily capacity building11 – taking 
advantage of the commercial banks, in which the government was a major share-
holder or special purpose banks for the distribution of subsidised and unlimited credit. 
Furthermore, these (almost unrestricted) credit lines were substituted with “preferen-
tial interest rates, foreign loans, tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances and 
tax holidays” (ibid, 426). According to E. M. Kim (1997), the next step in industrialisa-
tion, for which Chaebols were used, was to take up the technologically complex in-
dustrial projects through imitation and/or innovation. This brought ambitious export 
targets to be met within the planned time frame. As a result of all this, the Korean 
                                                 
10
 The Korean conglomerate known as Chaebol is defined as “a business group which consists of 
varied corporate enterprises engaged in diversified business areas, and typically owned and managed 
by one or a few interrelated families” (Ahn 2001, 441). 
11
 McDonnell and Elmore (1987) identify five possible mechanisms of intervention – mandates (rules), 
inducements (money / procurement), capacity-building (money / investments) and system-changing 
(authority). 
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economy concentrated considerably: while the top 10 Chaebols’ share in its economy 
made up 5.1% in 1973, it increased to 22.7% by 1989 and in the case of the top 30, 
from 9.8% to 29.6% (Ahn 2001, 426). 
 
It is important to realise that the concentration of a substantial proportion of the Kore-
an economy in Chaebols happened within the above described industrial policy con-
text over decades – starting from the absorption of “excess labour” to the develop-
ment of the absorptive capacity of foreign technology.  In other words, following the 
Japanese model, the Korean government was deeply engaged in the process of 
promoting industrial development. To achieve its aims, it “blurred the line between 
industrial and trade policy”, according to Ahn (ibid). This, together with the combina-
tion of inward and outward oriented polices of import substitution and export promo-
tion, has puzzled some of the most distinguished scholars of development economics 
like Kruger and Krugman.  
 
Kruger has been forced to change her view on Korea more than once over time. First 
in 1980, she argues that economic success of countries like Korea was a result of 
export promotion rather than import substitution polices. Moreover, she states in this 
connection that “it seems clear that export performance is a function in a large part of 
governmental policies” (Kruger 1980, 289). In 1993 she adds that: “To be sure, the 
Korean economy has not been characterised and is not characterised by laissez-
faire. But in contrast to the over-controlled, overregulated, highly distorted economies 
…, the Korean economy has been characterised by diminishing intervention in most 
spheres of economic activity, and the degree of distortion is considerably smaller” 
(Kruger 1993, 30). In 1995 she admits that the Korean government was heavily in-
volved in steel, heavy chemicals and car industries, but contrary to her previous posi-
tions, she simply claims that these investments were not successful. Rather than 
seeing the government intervention as the cause of the extraordinary results, she 
now interprets Korean success as being due to hard work combined with a sense of 
national danger or destiny (Kruger 1995, 40).  And then in 1998 she returns to the 
orthodox position and states that “by the early 1960s a few then-developing countries 
– most notably Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – had abandoned import 
substitution and adopted outer-oriented trade strategies. The results were spectacu-
larly rapid growth.” (Kruger 1998, 1514) 
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Krugman (1994a) has interpreted the East Asian economic development as a result 
of input-driven growth which owes much of its success to the mobilisation of vast 
amounts of labour and capital which makes the miracle a “myth”. Although he 
(1994b, 153) has advocated that also the US should identify a handful of strategic 
sectors such as “high technology” for state support, he is better known for his post-
factum position on the reasons for the East Asian financial crisis, which claims that it 
was only a matter of time before the practice of administratively picking the winners 
produced painful results. According to this line of reasoning, the negative side effects 
of state intervention had always been part of the developmental state package in the 
form of bad debts (see Lim 1999), but by the end of the millennium they spiralled into 
systematic crisis. As Krugman (1998, 74) states: 
By now the outline of how Asia fell apart is pretty familiar. At least in part, the region’s 
downfall was a punishment for its sins. We all know what we should have known even 
during the boom years: that there was a dark underside to “Asian Values,” that the 
success of too many Asian Businessmen depended less on what they know than on 
whom they know. Crony capitalism meant, in particular, that dubious investments – 
unneeded office blocks outside Bangkok, ego-driven diversification by Korean 
Chaebols – were cheerfully funded by local banks, as long as the borrower had the 
right government connections. 
 
Despite the decades of sustained economic growth that the Korean developmental 
state had produced, the country was heavily hit by the East Asian financial crisis. As 
a result, Korea had to negotiate with the IMF and its international partners one of the 
largest bailouts ever (Pallack 1997, Ahn 2001, 420, Foreign Policy 2008). This meant 
that Korea had to accept the structural adjustment programme including the liberali-
sation and deregulation polices – to negotiate the neoliberal paradigm as document-
ed in detail by Pirie (2008, Ch. 7-9) and criticised by Crotty & Lee (2001a, 2001b, 
2006). Nevertheless, one should be careful about interpreting that the crisis and the 
neoliberal policy transfers have changed the close relations between state and big 
business in Korea. As Woo-Cumings (1999a, x) warns, we should be critical of the 
mood changes towards the East Asian Miracle in the context where nothing funda-
mental has actually changed – “[t]he problems of corruption and lack of transparency 
in Southeast Asia and financial instability in the massively leveraged Korean corpo-
rate sector have long been understood and well documented”. Lee (2002) goes even 
further to argue that the old (informal) rules of the game will not end with the introduc-
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tion of new (formal) regulations (lack of which was assumed to be the underlying rea-
son for the East Asian financial crisis for those who did not accept the speculation 
argument). For him there is only one solution: one has to change the social relations 
underlying the political intervention together with getting the state out. For others, the 
vulnerability of the Korean development model has become apparent only recently in 
the context of the global financial and economic crises. And now that a growing num-
ber of scholars (see e.g. Bugra & Agartan 2007, Joerges et al. 2005, Webster et al. 
2009, and Deyo 2012) realise that Polanyi (1944 [1957]) was correct about the con-
tradiction of capitalism – commodification in the form of the deepening of markets to 
the spheres of life traditionally not controlled by it equals the breeding of insecurity – 
it makes sense to examine more closely the Korean social model. 
 
 
2. South Korean Welfare Model 
 
Welfare state and regime literature discusses the macro-sociological and social poli-
cy dimensions of contemporary political economies from a comparative perspective. 
While the comparative analysis of welfare states and regimes goes back to the fifties 
(see Briggs 1961, Holmwood 2000, and Titmuss 1972 [1987]), it really exploded with 
the publication of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) book entitled Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism.12 Based on the comparative typology of welfare states in Western socie-
ties, Esping-Andersen identified along the lines of the most important political ideolo-
gies in the West the social democratic, liberal and conservative/corporatist models. 
Although the typology was initially limited to Western countries, the idea of classifying 
welfare systems into typologies has quickly spread beyond Western countries as the 
overviews of welfare state regime literature (Arts & Gelissen 2002, Pierson 2006) as 
well as its recent developments and new directions clearly indicate (Castles et al. 
2010 and Ferragina & Seeleib-Kaiser 2011). 
 
Within this literature and research tradition, a growing number of scholars of East 
Asian welfare regimes have realised and criticised the Euro-centric conceptualisation 
of welfare regimes and their typologies (see e.g. Y. M. Kim 2005). More specifically, 
researchers attempting to understand the East Asian welfare systems have common-
                                                 
12
 For an overview of how the “welfare modelling business” has become an entrance branch of aca-
demic industry since the publication of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism see Abrahamson 
(1999). For an alternative approach to that of Esping-Andersen’s see Headey et al. (1999).  
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ly argued that the region’s social sector does not fit into any of the Esping-Andersen’s 
ideal types. While Esping-Andersen (1997, 179) has responded by warning that “any 
attempt at labelling the Japanese welfare state is premature since it has not yet sunk 
its roots, institutionally speaking” and hence has tried to solve the puzzle for the time 
being by proposing a hybrid model: placing Japan between Europe and America, 
many others have argued for the extension of the typology by adding the East Asian 
ideal type. But even this has not satisfied some as there is an on-going debate over 
the issue as to whether the East Asian welfare regimes can be grouped into one wel-
fare regime subtype or not. Understandably, in order for the typology to make sense, 
there cannot be too many classes. Yet to put all East Asian welfare systems into one 
category does injustice to the country specific differences and nuances. One solution 
that has been suggested is to differentiate between Northeast and Southeast Asian 
welfare regimes (Tang 2000, Ramesh 2004, Holliday 2005 and Wilding 2008). As a 
reaction to this, however, there is also a recurrent interest in emphasising the com-
monalities over differences and identifying the common attributes of the East Asian 
welfare model (H-J. Kwon 1999, 83-84; White & Goodman 1998, 17-18; Abrahamson 
2011). 
 
Richness of terminology to describe the East Asian welfare model in general and the 
Korean one in particular suggest that there is little consensus about the distinctive 
features of its nature and/or the fact that the object of analysis has been undergoing 
fast changes.  For instance, the nature of the East Asian welfare model has been 
described under a large variety of labels – from Oikonomic (C. Jones 1990), Confu-
cian (C. Jones 1993), conservative (Gottfried & O’Reilly 2002), developmental wel-
fare system (White & Goodman, 1998, 15), ‘hybrid’ (Esping-Andersen 1997), informal 
security (Wood & Gough 2006), informal care regime (Abrahamson 2011, 16) Japan-
focused (Goodman & Peng 1996, 216), Japanese-style (Peng 2008, 178), oriental 
(White and Goodman, 1998), Pacific (Castells 1992) to tiger social policy and welfare 
capitalism (Holliday & Wilding 2003), and most recently as welfare developmentalism 
(Kwon 2010). Within this “politics of development policy labelling” (Wood 1985), the 
Korean welfare system, as a unique social model, has been labelled as developmen-
tal welfare state (Lee & Ku 2007, and Lee et al. 2011), minimalist welfare state (Lee 
et al. 2011), productive welfare model (Ramesh  et al. 2004), productivist welfare 
capitalism (PWC) (Holliday 2000, 2005), productivist social policy (Kwon & Holliday 
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2007), (emerging) productivist (Wood & Gough 2006, 1706), productivist regime 
(Gough 2004), development-universalist (Ku with Finer 2007, 123) or most recently 
as weak-productive-protective and as productive + employment protection type 
(Hudson & Kühner 2011, 50-54), productive welfare under Kim Dae-jung govern-
ment, participatory welfare under Roh Moo-hyun government (Chan 2006) or as a 
result of democratic government policies as the active welfare (Lee et al. 2011). 
 
All this indicates that Korean socio-economic model has been understood as a 
unique type that has prioritised economic developmental goals over social. There-
fore, observers often argue that Korea as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong have been 
able to grow so fast and catch up with the developing countries so quickly because 
they saved on social costs. Most explicitly, Deyo (1992) and Holliday (2000, 2005) 
argue that East Asian NIC have subordinated their social sector to the economy and 
this very characteristic differentiates them from all other welfare regimes outside or 
inside East Asia, making them similar to few welfare states like Taiwan. As Holliday 
(2005) states:  
Beginning with policy, PWC is characterised by a broad thrust that prioritises econom-
ic growth, and makes this the fundamental orientation of policy makers not only 
across economic sectors but also across social and cultural sectors. Policy spheres 
that tend to be thought of as straddling the economic/social divide are therefore read 
in economic rather than social terms. One instance is relations between capital and 
labour, which are skewed as much as possible towards the needs of capital, with the 
result that the power of organised labour is severely limited. 
… 
In PWC, funding for social policy is generally low so as not to crowd out entrepreneur-
ial and productive activity. However, because social policy is read in economic terms, 
and some elements are held to make a positive contribution to growth, funding is not 
pared back completely. Indeed, some social policy spheres may be characterised by 
quite significant investment, designed to provide the society as a whole with a com-
petitive edge over its main economic rivals. The clearest instance is education, to 
which a productivist society may devote quite significant resources. … Overall, social 
policy funding is likely to be less extensive than in other worlds of welfare capitalism, 
because such [a] policy has a strictly subordinate status. Sources of funding may de-
rive from both the public and private sectors. As PWC seeks to promote entrepreneur-
ial activity, it has a natural tendency to favour private funding over public. However, if 
the private sector fails to meet social policy needs held to be crucial to economic ad-
vance, the state can certainly be expected to step in to meet the shortfall. 
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This view that the subordinated role of the social sector to the economy is so distinc-
tively unique that it can be regarded as a fourth type of welfare capitalism, contradicts 
the position of some of the most well-known scholars. For instance, Esping-Andersen 
argues on the basis of the Japanese case that the socio-economic relations of East 
Asian countries have simply not matured enough to be properly classified among the 
welfare states.  Other scholars such as Habermas (1976), Offe (1984, 147) and 
Bruce et al. (1999, 22-23) state in different contexts that the promotion of economic 
efficiency along with social equality, social integration and avoidance of social exclu-
sion and class conflict, the promotion of social stability and autonomy as well as a 
reduction in poverty are the broadly accepted legitimisation methods for politicians 
and policy makers in all kinds of welfare regimes. Bruce et al. go on to make a nor-
mative argument that high economic growth is more important than anything else in 
the above mentioned list – it is the supreme goal of any welfare regime. (In fact, they 
go even so far as to argue that economic growth is not a practical but a moral aim of 
any welfare regime – not a means towards some more higher-minded end but a goal 
in its own right). If these assessments and positions were correct, there would be little 
point in speaking of a special (called productivist or any other of the above men-
tioned) type of welfare model in East Asia in general or Korea in particular. 
 
It is argued in this paper that the ‘Growth First, Distribution Later’ (Lee et al. 2011) 
policy paradigm in East Asia in general and in Korea in particular is special and al-
lows one to speak of a unique socio-economic welfare arrangement. Although it re-
sembles the empirically based theory of Kuznets, known as the Kuznets curve, which 
shows that inequality rises before it falls in the process of economic development, the 
productivist / developmentalist welfare regime stands out because its defining feature 
is the subordination of social policy to economic policy (for details see Holland 2000, 
2005 and Kwon & Holliday 2006). It is special compared to others because social 
responsibilities, traditionally understood to be the responsibility of the state in West-
ern societies, have been taken over by companies (esp. chaebols) in Korea (Woo-
Cumings 2001, 370). This has two contradictory implications. On the one hand, the 
costs of the Korean welfare model could be expected to be greatly underreported in 
international comparisons (with or without the aim of typology buildings). This “de-
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pendent variable problem” (Clasen & Siegel 2007)13 has typically led to the second 
best choices in the form of expenditure analysis. Instead of real data on the theoreti-
cal concept, the constructs are operationalised via intervening variables or proxies 
measured with aggregate spending data on the social sector.  But if the roles carried 
out traditionally in advanced welfare capitalisms by the state are taken over by pri-
vate, non-governmental or international entities in the less developed world, the offi-
cial data simply does not show the actual level of social protection provided and ben-
efits received. Therefore, in this context where the role of the state is taken over by 
some other actors, it is important to realise the conceptual difference and implications 
between “welfare regime(s)” and “welfare state(s)” as the scholars from the University 
of Bath have been stressing (see Gough 2001, Gouth & Wood with co-authors 2004 
as well as Wood & Gough 2006). 
 
The Korean productivist / developmentalist welfare regime is unique because it has 
produced “growth with equity” according to World Bank (1993a) and Rodrik (1996a, 
20-21) while being at the same time “a paradise for big business” according to Woo-
Cumings (1999b, 30). This strange formula worked as long as the Korean conglom-
erates were able to compete in the global marketplace. Paradoxically, what has been 
described as a paradigm shift in the welfare capitalism literature from ‘Keynesian wel-
fare national state (KWNS)’ to ‘Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(SWPR)’ (Jessop, 1993, 1994, 1999 & 2002) seems to have worked the other way 
around in Korea. Developmental policies place emphasis on growth enhancing fac-
tors such as human capital and infrastructure and only later extend the social benefits 
to people as social rights. Indeed, the policy tools promoted under SWPR such as 
“permanent innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies by intervening on 
the supply-side and strengthening as far as possible their structural and/or systemic 
competitiveness” (ibid 1999, 355) is very similar to the socio-economic policies that 
have been implemented in Korea for decades. In that sense, the emergence of 
KWNS in Korea was a combined result of democratisation and the need to offset the 
negative side-effects of the global financial and economic crises. In other words, in-
stead of promoting efficiency, flexibility and innovativeness, Korea faces in the short 
and medium term the challenge of deepening welfare provisions, increasing spend-
                                                 
13
 The “dependent variable problem” refers to the methodological challenges that research on welfare 
states and regimes has been suffering due to conceptual and data access limitations. 
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ing on and improving access to social benefits. Unlike most other developed coun-
tries, Korea needs to direct its welfare policies from SWPR to KWNS.  
Indeed, only recently has Korea been under real pressure to provide more welfare 
benefits based on social rights in addition to its decade long concentration on SWPR 
with the aim of securing structural or systematic competitiveness in the economic 
catch-up process. While Offe (1984, 148) explains that “[i]n the light of the Keynesian 
doctrine of economic policy, the welfare state came to be seen not so much as a bur-
den imposed upon the economy, but a built-in economic and political stabilizer which 
could help to regenerate the forces of economic growth and prevent the economy 
from spiralling downward into deep recessions”, it has not quite been the case in Ko-
rea. Only minimum welfare was provided to selected beneficiaries as long as the 
state was repressive and authoritarian and the economy was growing fast. Neverthe-
less, the Keynesian logic as an argument for state provision of safety-nets has been 
developing together with the democratic forces even in countries like Korea and has 
intensified with the economic, demographic and social changes – just as the modern-
isation theory would suggest. Indeed, several scholars of the Korean welfare regime 
(see e.g. Croissant 2004, 520) report increased popular (democratic) pressure to 
widen the accessibility to social benefits and deepen the welfare provisions due to 
the low fertility rate and an ageing population, intensified female labour market partic-
ipation, growing divorce rates, spreading of one-generation or single-person house-
holds, urbanisation and rising post-materialistic and individualistic values.  
 
However, the controversy over the Korean welfare regime does not stop here. On the 
one hand, Hort and Kuhnle (2000, 168) question the position held above about the 
Korean productivist welfare model (i.e. prioritisation of that has allowed the develop-
mental state to save on social costs in order to promote economic growth. According 
to them, 
… chronological latecomers in social security legislation were not latecomers in terms 
of ‘developmental’ time. Rather than arresting or retarding welfare state development, 
our Asian countries even preceded European nations in the sense that they adopted 
state welfare programmes at lower levels of modernisation. This casts doubt on the 
idea that the Asian economic development was based on growth without welfare. In-
stead, here as in Europe, modernisation was accompanied by the adoption of social 
security programmes.   
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On the other hand, Kwon & Holliday (2007, 242) argue that the image that Korea has 
now become more welfare oriented after the East Asian financial crisis is a myth. 
They state that: 
When the Asian ﬁnancial crisis took a heavy toll on Korea in the late 1990s, policy 
makers responded by extending [the] welfare policy. For many analysts, this was a 
paradoxical move, marking a fundamental reconﬁguration of the social policy system. 
This article contests that interpretation. It examines the changes made to Korean so-
cial policy in recent years, and considers their impact on the Korean welfare state. It 
notes both that welfare extensions have been comparatively limited, and that they 
have often formed part of wider attempts to boost labour market ﬂexibility. It thus con-
cludes that [the] limited expansion of the Korean welfare state is chieﬂy an attempt to 
bolster industrial competitiveness and economic growth. For now, Korea retains the 
productivist social policy orientation that has long characterised it. It also concedes, 
however, that in the future underlying social change, notably a rapidly ageing popula-
tion, may prompt policy makers to make signiﬁcant changes to the Korean welfare 
state. 
 
One could propose a resolution to this controversy by arguing that education must be 
seen as part of social sector and its costs. Although the connection between the edu-
cational policy and welfare states/regime analysis has traditionally been weak and 
has been connected to the social policy in social policy literature in general (see 
Room 2002, Midgley & Tang 2001, 251) or to the national welfare models in particu-
lar (see e.g. Heidenheimer 1981 for the US), it has been the accepted view within the 
new political economy of development. For instance, the Washington Consensus 
(Williamson 1990) (the cookbook used to reform the economies of East and Central 
Europe on the development lessons gained in Latin America) suggested transferring 
the social sector expenditures to the sectors which can be considered as invest-
ments, such as education. Also, the World Bank (1993a) emphasised in its miracle 
report on East Asia that the success of this region has been biased (in addition to 
export orientation and what they interpreted as market friendly economic policies) 
with a strong emphasis on education. Indeed, within the welfare state literature, the 
connection between education and the social sector has been brought more directly 
into the discussion only within the East Asian welfare state regime literature. Indeed, 
most comparative research on East Asian welfare regimes has claimed that the mira-
cle of fast growth with equity has been possible only due to the absence of the big 
and expensive welfare state in these NIC. As mentioned above, the argument has 
been that instead of depending on taxpayers’ money, these East Asian welfare sys-
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tems have depended heavily on the family and allowed the government to pursue 
different developmental goals. But this is so only if one assesses and conceptualises 
the productivist welfare regimes and their typologies by the Euro-centric standards 
and concepts. If one gives up the “cunning of imperialist reason” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1999) and if education is seen as part of the social sector and its costs, 
the essence of developmental welfare capitalism becomes clearer.   
 
In this context, the Korean welfare policy, previously oriented towards economic 
competitiveness and currently being redirected slightly more towards social security, 
contrasts with many Western welfare models. The former has depended more on 
informal security mechanisms while the latter has traditionally provided benefits fund-
ed from taxes instead of helping to overcome obstacles needed to find more sustain-
able solutions. However, both have recently started to reorient the emphasis towards 
an active labour market and innovation polices. The global economic and financial 
crisis and the accumulation of local social problems in the East and West will proba-
bly make the welfare regimes more similar in the upcoming years and decades. This 
convergence is reflected in the analytical models such as the one suggested by Choi 
(2007) that merges Gough’s and his collaborators’ informal security regimes ap-
proach with Esping-Andersen’s inspired welfare capitalism analysis. 
 
This realisation that there is a strong connection between education and social sector 
polices is likely to  gain wider acceptance, the more alarming the future of welfare 
state in the demographically critical nation states become and the more these econ-
omies have to compete globally. This has already led some scholars (see Cerny & 
Evans 2000, 2004; Evans & Cerny 2003) to suggest that the welfare state is being 
replaced with a “competition state” that channels the social sector costs towards edu-
cation and training. (One only needs to consider the numerous active labour market 
or life-long-learning polices that have been implemented and are being funded by 
taxpayers’ money in high income countries or by donor money in not so high income 
countries).  Others have gone even further to argue that the welfare states have 
(had) to respond to the emergence of the globalised, post-industrial knowledge socie-
ty with emphasis on human capital investment. (One only needs to consider here the 
number of polices directed towards building innovation and knowledge capacities).  
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3. South Korean Developmental Welfare Capitalism and its Major Challenges 
  
This section augments the previous sections in order to link the production and the 
welfare regimes to each other as well as to the political system. Last but not least, an 
attempt is made to point out the major challenges that the system faces. Using 
Soskice’s (2007) extended VoC framework, it will be shown that the Korean political 
economy arrangement has not been static but has evolved in stages to face the chal-
lenges of the era: from the developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s, to the mod-
ernisation state in the 1980s and finally to the contradictions of the welfare state in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Hancké et al. (2007, 7-8) review the criticism that has been 
raised against the original VoC’s analytical frame of Hall & Soskie (2001) and show 
that it can be questioned for being static, functionalistic, ignorant of the endogenous 
sources of national transformation and within-system diversity, mechanistic in its 
conception of institutional complementarities and, and hence, institutionally determin-
istic. In other words, VoC neglects the role of state and class relations, interpreting a 
firm as a passive ‘institution-taker’ rather than understanding it as an active and crea-
tive entrepreneur who can take a variety of forms within a national system. It has lim-
ited the number of possible varieties of capitalisms to just two (classifying them either 
as coordinated or liberal market economies), which reflect its bias towards manufac-
turing and insensitivity towards service economies. Furthermore, it misrepresents 
economies as isolated entities without linkages between them or the forces of global-
isation, and is unrealistic about the compromise and conflict (by emphasising the 
former and understating the latter). Finally it neglects the gender (inequality) issues 
and as Kang (2006) adds, has a strong rational-choice view of institutions. 
 
Such criticism seems to be relevant within the discussion of Korean production and 
welfare regime literature because the two research traditions hardly build on each 
other’s strengths in order to overcome the limitations. Despite the discussion about 
the importance and value of interdisciplinary research, there is hardly any systematic 
attempt to relate VoC in political economy literature and “welfare capitalisms” in com-
parative social policy and sociology literature with each other. On the one hand, polit-
ical economists do not appear to read or show interest in the comparative social poli-
cy and sociology literature on welfare states and regimes. On the other hand, the 
comparative social policy scholars and sociologists appear to care equally little for 
the political economy of development literature.  Indeed, a reader who is new to the 
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social models literature would be surprised to learn that there is little to be found in 
the welfare capitalism literature about political economy, VoC or what former com-
parative economic systems scholars now call “new comparative economics” (see 
Shleifer 2002, Djankov et al. 2003). Although Esping-Andersen’s (1994, 720-726) 
chapter in the Handbook of Economic Sociology makes some cautious moves to re-
late the welfare states to economic performance, and Block’s (1994) entry in the 
same handbook manages almost the impossible – to provide an overview of “The 
Roles of the State in the Economy” (including an attempt to relate the different ideal 
types of state interference to the functioning of the economy), these are rather ab-
stract and hesitant moves.  
 
In this context, efforts made by E. M. Kim (1993), Holliday (2005) and H-J. Kwon 
(2007) to merge production and welfare regime literature as well as an attempt made 
by W. Kim (2010) to link changes in politics to economics and labour struggles in or-
der to understand the Korean case are less universalistic but actually offer more 
practical guidance. To build on these analyses, the following paragraphs will relate 
the previously discussed Korean developmental state and social model to the chang-
es in its political arrangement. It uses the above mentioned Soskice’s (2007) extend-
ed VoC framework in order to show how the Korean political economy arrangement 
has evolved. Similar to Peng & Wong (2008) and Lee et al. (2011) the evolution is 
arranged in three stages: from the developmental state in the 1960s and 1970s, to 
the modernisation state in the 1980s and finally to the contested welfare state the 
1990s and 2000s. Indeed, to comprehend the Korean developmental welfare regime 
and the reasons for its past success, one has to understand not only its economic 
progress but also dynamic changes that have been introduced and institutionalised 
into its social and political arrangements. In addition to the changes in the economic 
and social systems described in the previous sections, the developmental welfare 
capitalism that has been evolving over decades in Korea has a clear connection to its 
political situation as has been shown among others by Asami (2011), Chan (2006), 
Lee et al. (2011) and Peng & Wong (2008). Indeed, as shown in the following tables, 
Korean political arrangements at any given point in time reflect the level of economic 
development and starting conditions, on the one hand, and the balance of power be-
tween labour, capital and political establishment, on the other hand. 
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Table 1. The Politics of Institutional Evolution 
 Developmental state, 
1960s and 1970s 
Democratisation, 
1980s and 1990s 
Post-industrialism, 
1990s and 2000s 
Problems Economic under-
development; political 
legitimacy gap 
Social and economic 
inequality; societal  
mobilization 
Economic restructuring; 
reinvigorate economic 
growth 
Window of opportunity Post-war and post-
colonial reconstruction 
Democratic opening; 
electoral competition 
1997 financial crisis; 
demographic change; 
globalization 
Dominant political 
coalition 
Productivist coalition Progressive coalition 
(civil society, the state) 
‘New’ productivist coali-
tion (social policy advo-
cates, economic reform-
ers, international part-
ners) 
Purpose of social 
policy 
Rewarding productivist 
sectors of society; facili-
tating economic / indus-
trial development 
Social justice, socio-
economic redistribution, 
household protection 
Activation of productive 
labour market; human 
capital investment 
Source: Peng & Wong (2008, 70) 
 
 
Table 2. The Development of Welfare Policies 
 
Periods Regime Economic policies Welfare policies 
Authoritarian  
dictatorship  
 
Park Jung-hee  
(1961-1979)  
Chun Doo-hwan  
(1980-1987)  
 
Exported oriented  
Industrialisation  
(Government dominant  
growth strategy)  
 
Growth First, Distribution  
Later  
(Developmental Welfare  
State or Minimalist Wel-
fare State)  
 
Democratisation  
 
Roh Tae-woo  
(1988-1992)  
Kim Young-sam  
(1993-1997)  
 
Transition period  
 
Democratic  
government 
Kim Dae-jung  
(1998-2002)  
Noh Mu-hyun  
(2003-2007)  
Lee Myung-bak  
(2008-present) 
Globalization and 
postindustrialisation  
(balance between 
growth and distribution)  
 
Productive Welfare  
Participatory Welfare  
Active Welfare 
 
Source: Lee et al. (2011, 8) 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, Korea in the 1960s and 1970s can be described as a devel-
opmental state in which the industrial policy was used to promote economic growth 
and the social sector was subordinated to the economic sector. While government 
economic policy was automatic and sector neutral in the 1960s, it introduced seven 
specific industry promotion acts for capacity building in the 1970s. In Gereffi’s termi-
nology, the emphasis was on primary EOI and secondary ISI & EOI at this stage of 
economic development. Although labour was severely repressed during these two 
decades and the social policy could be symbolised by the slogan “Grow first, distrib-
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ute later” the government did actually introduce the first welfare programmes already 
in this period: the Family Planning Programme (FPP) in 1962 (to bring down the fertil-
ity rate that was as high as 6.0 in 1960), the Industrial Accident Insurance (IAI) in 
1964 (to provide some assurance for work related injuries), the Public Assistance 
Programme (PAP) in 1965 (for the poorest of the poor), and the National Health In-
surance (NHI) in 1977 (for the employed in the public sector). All this was implement-
ed by the powerful bureaucracy that benefited from competent foreign policy advis-
ers/partners such as USAID under the apparently authoritarian political regime that 
purposefully delayed democratisation. In short, the limited coverage welfare regime 
was devoted to the promotion of economic growth.   
 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
1960s & 1970s 
   
Production Regime 
Industrial policy 
Primary EOI 
Secondary ISI & EOI  
Labour repression Welfare Regime 
Grow first, distribute later 
Welfare system subordinated 
to production regime 
 
 
Govt. policy: 
- automatic & sector  
    neutral in 1960s;  
- big push of 7 specific industry 
promotion Acts for capacity 
building in 1970s 
  
 
  
FPP 1962, IAI 1964,  
PAP 1965, NHI 1977  
 
 
Political System 
Authoritarian  
Delayed democratisation 
Determined elite, powerful & 
competent bureaucracy 
Quality of foreign policy advice  
 
 
Figure 3. South Korean Developmental State in 1960s and 1970s. 
Source: Composed by the author 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, Korea in the 1980s can be described as a modernisa-
tion state. This was the era of big business in the Korean economy, which is why 
some journalists labelled it “Chaebol Republic”. Indeed, as mentioned in the first half 
of the paper, while the share of the top 10% of Chaebols in 1973 was 5.1%, it in-
creased to 22.7% by 1989. Behind this concentration was the diversified EOI and 
complex technology production. Big business-government relations were character-
ised as well coordinated and dominated by the industry lobby. Welfare regime during 
this decade can be described as patrimonial or conservative – referring to the fact 
that social benefits were still largely limited to civil servants, the military and teachers. 
Apart from the introduction of the National Pension Scheme (NPS) in 1988, not much 
was done during this decade to deepen the welfare provisions even though there 
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was pressure for social justice, redistribution and family protection. This led instead to 
unionisation and militarisation of labour, opening up the road to democratisation, 
which was initiated in the late 1980s and consolidated in the early 1990s. 
 
 
MODERNISATION STATE 
1980s 
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Figure 4. South Korean Modernisation State in 1980s. 
Source: Composed by the author 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5, Korea in the 1990s and 2000s can be described as contested 
welfare state. While big business had grown stronger and the state had grown weak-
er due to the internationalisation and global competitiveness of the economy in the 
1980s, the state had to democratise and start responding to the popular pressure for 
more welfare benefits in the 1990s. In addition to this, Korea in the 1990s and 2000s 
has been facing major challenges: the economy went through the East Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997-8, and it has been heavily hit as an export oriented economy by the 
global financial and economic crisis. It now also needs to compete globally, which 
means constant pressure not only for efficiency and productivity but also from busi-
ness to eliminate the social responsibilities developed during the previous stages of 
development. As Chang (1999, 34-35) reports: 
In 1996, the Korea Federation of Industries, the association of the chaebols prepared 
a report arguing for the abolition of all government ministries except the ministries of 
defence and foreign affairs and for the consequent reduction of government staff by 
90%. The report had to be officially withdrawn because it was unfortunately leaked in 
advance by a careless reporter and created a popular uproar. While the chance of 
such proposal being taken seriously was non-existent even in Korea that was then 
(and still is to a large extent) in the grip of an anti-statist reaction, but the incident is il-
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lustrative of the aggressiveness that the chaebols were showing in pushing for greater 
business freedom in the recent period. 
 
The political system has been democratising, which also means that politicians are 
looking for votes and thus hesitate to implement reforms with high short term costs 
and incremental benefits over the long term. Last but not least, the welfare state has 
to find solutions to challenges, a task that has been postponed for decades. For in-
stance, R. S. Jones (2008) lists the following challenges related to the social sector: 
an ageing population (that is the fastest in OECD countries), low fertility rate (that has 
dropped to 1.2 – suggesting a low tax base for years to come), a postponed pension 
system reform (reflecting the fact that the reform with an aim to find a sustainable 
solution has been blocked at parliament level several times since 2003), unemploy-
ment and NEET phenomena (that have affected 20% of the 15-29 age group and 
25% of the holders of tertiary education), health care accessibility due to heavy de-
pendency on the ability to pay out of the pocket14 and raising public expenditure.15 
There is also tremendous pressure on students to perform well at all levels of the ed-
ucation system (reflected in twice as high private tutoring than OECD average, which 
appears to kill creativity instead of contributing to the innovation society – a factor 
that should provide the opportunity to pay for the increasing social costs in an ageing 
society (OECD 2012, 23-25).   
 
Although the government has started to seek solutions, the postponement of the 
timely dealing with social sector problems and the subordination of the sector to eco-
nomic priorities have resulted in a backlog over the decades, which is anything but 
easy to solve. For instance, the government introduced Infant-Child Care Programme 
(ICCP) in 1991 and expanded it later; launched Mother-Child Welfare (MCW) pro-
gramme in 1999 and reformed it into Mother-Father-Child Welfare Programme 
(MFCWP) in 2002; set up a committee on Low Fertility and Population Ageing Policy 
(LFPAP) in 2005 in order to find solutions to the challenges related to demography. 
As shown by S. Kwon (2008) and Kwon et al. (2009), it also strengthened and en-
larged the Livelihood Protection Programme into the National Basic Livelihood Secu-
rity System (NBLSS) through which most assistance is being provided, and it intro-
duced the Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
                                                 
14
 According to OECD (2012, 21) Korea’s private share is the fourth largest in OECD.  
15
 According to Jones (2008, 27-28) Korean public expenditure on health care is the fastest growing in 
OECD. 
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to boost work incentives in 2008.  Last but not least, the government has attempted 
on numerous occasions to reform the National Pension Scheme (NPS) which has, 
however, been blocked several times at parliament level. 
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Figure 5. South Korean Contested Welfare State in 1990s and 2000s.  
Source: Composed by the author 
 
 
The situation remains alarming despite the introduction of these and other pro-
grammes (see Chan 2006 and Peng 2008, 174). Indeed, based on a number of poli-
cy analyses and progress reports provided by Cho (2006), Elekdag (2012), Goishi 
(2011), R. S. Jones (2008), OECD (2012) and Peng & Wong (2008) about the Kore-
an ability to cope with the social problems, the situation remains extremely challeng-
ing. One can even say that the Korean low fertility rate and the rapidly ageing society, 
the rising divorce rate, low labour force participation (i.e. NEET problem and raising 
unemployment), inadequate income and long-term care for the elderly, limited access 
to public pensions, health care and other social benefits, rising inequality and relative 
poverty, pressure on the education and training system (reflected in the heavy reli-
ance on private tutoring) make the socio-economic and political situation under the 
circumstances of the worldwide economic recession and intensified globalisation al-
most explosive.  
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Conclusion 
 
There is growing interest among political economists, comparative public policy 
scholars and sociologists towards understanding the national differences between 
different forms of welfare capitalisms.  In this context, the decades of sustained eco-
nomic growth in East Asia have earned the admiration of policy makers, making it an 
exemplar for economic development that others were recommended to follow.  But it 
has also amplified an academic discussion on how governments in countries like Ko-
rea seemed (at least initially) to be able to intervene without inviting rent seeking or 
distorting the market. As the East Asian miracle has not been replicated in the rest of 
the developing world, it suggests that the reasons behind the unique development 
path are more complex and context specific than any single variable analysis could 
indicate. This paper took a closer look at three unique and interrelated sets of ar-
rangements with respect to the Korean developmental welfare capitalism in order to 
understand better the kind of capitalist society that is emerging in Korea as well as to 
study what others could learn from its experience.  
 
As shown in the first part of the paper, the Korean developmental state has its origin 
in the Japanese model. It had to find a balance between direct intervention through 
the industrial policy and the market in order to promote economic growth. As a result 
of these peculiar methods of state intervention (including industrial policy and special 
arrangements between the government and big business) Korea, went through stag-
es where the ordination from primary ISI was followed by primary EOI and then by 
secondary ISI and EOI. But one has to agree with scholars who are “extremely scep-
tical” about the transferability of the Korean development state and its experience to 
other countries because it would demand drastic changes in national economic policy 
making and implementation – “an overriding commitment to meaningful economic 
development, commitment that few political leaders of less developed countries ap-
pear capable of making” (Waelbroeck 1998a, 42 & 58). Furthermore, one has to be 
even more sceptical about the desirability to transfer these political economy ar-
rangements, given the vulnerability that the sequences of financial and economic cri-
ses have exposed and the obvious emergence of cumulative social problems. 
 
It has been claimed that the East Asian miracle in countries like Korea has been pos-
sible only due to the absence of the big and expensive welfare state. The argument 
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has been that instead of taxpayers’ money, the welfare system has depended heavily 
on the family and allowed the government to pursue the national developmental 
goals. Although the economic development model had to respond to social and polit-
ical pressures and much has been done to make the welfare regime more inclusive 
and increase the coverage, some scholars like Hwang (2011, 9) argue that the fun-
damental aim of the system to limit the social sector to a subordinate role has not 
changed, and the amendments have been made so that the social policies would not 
undermine the growth potential of the Korean economy. Directing the social costs to 
areas which could be considered as investments is in accordance with the Washing-
ton Consensus (Williamson 1990) and the World Bank’s (1993a) interpretation of the 
reasons behind the East Asian economic miracle. It also corresponds with the criti-
cism that has been inspired from the Euro-centric conceptualisation of welfare re-
gimes by Midgley & Tang (2001, 251) and Room (2002) who suggest that education 
must be seen as part of social sector and its costs. Furthermore, as shown in the last 
sections of the paper, the suppressed role of the social sector has led to the accumu-
lation of a long list of challenges and problems in Korean society that are difficult to 
solve with or without education – so much so that the Korean welfare situation can be 
considered as explosive. 
 
The Korean case indicates that the developmental welfare capitalism can produce 
economic growth under an undemocratic political system if the latter has elite com-
mitted to development, a powerful and competent bureaucracy as well as strong for-
eign partners and advisors to rely upon. But along the lines of Polanyi, Korean devel-
opmental welfare capitalism shows that (spread of) markets indeed breed insecurity – 
especially for the export oriented economy with a relatively limited domestic market 
that relies heavily on global financial capital and consumer demand. It also suggests 
that as long as the political system was undemocratic, the social sector could only 
care about the production related issues and provide security and safety-net for the 
state employed. Nevertheless, once the economy became sophisticated and started 
to require a better educated labour force, the demands for political democratisation 
and wider access to social benefits emerged. Paradoxically, it has become apparent 
that some of the social sector reforms, such as the aim of making pension system 
more sustainable, are actually more difficult to carry out under the democratic gov-
ernment than it would have been before. 
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Dynamic changes in the Korean political economy and social model during the past 
five decades suggest that the role and relationships between socio-economic ar-
rangements and political institutions are not fixed but subject to change over time. 
While the original conceptualisations of VoC or welfare capitalism could lead one to 
suggest that fundamental socio-economic and political institutions in society are 
change resistant, recent updates to VoC literature (see Hall 2003, 2007 and Hall & 
Thelen 2009) envision also the possibility of evolution over time. As the analysis pre-
sented in this paper shows, there is actually no contradiction as the Korean socio-
economic and political arrangements reflect the balance of power between labour, 
capital and the political establishment of the particular era, on the one hand, and the 
level of economic development and starting conditions, on the other hand. Now that 
the political system has been democratised and the social sector problems, which 
were repressed for decades have surfaced, no longer to be ignored, Korean devel-
opmental welfare capitalism faces a major challenge to keep the economy competi-
tive while the political system is under democratic pressure to find solutions to the 
enormous social sector problems. 
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